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Chapter 5 Reliabilism, Induction, and Scepticism
5.1 Introduction
At the end of chapter 3 I pointed out that the teleological theory of representation has 
radically anti-verificationist consequences. The contents of belief are fixed by their 
consequences for action, not by the circumstances that lead believers to adopt them. 
So it is perfectly possible that a judgement should have a given truth condition, and 
yet human beings be systematically prone to form this belief when it is false. 
Such a realist1 account of representation might be thought to open the door to 
scepticism: if truth-conditions transcend evidence, then what assurance do we have 
that our beliefs are free of error? In this chapter I want to show how this scep tical 
threat to knowledge can be met from within a realist perspective. Accordingly, in 
what follows I shall take the implications of chapter 3 as read, and assume without 
further argument that judgements about the natural world answer to non-verification 
ist truth conditions. My focus here will rather be on the notion of knowledge, and on 
how a proper understanding of this notion enables us to give a adequate response to 
scepticism, even within the framework of a realist theory of representation. At the 
beginning of the next chapter, however, I shall return to the general debate between 
realism and anti-realism, and compare my overall realist attitude to representation and 
knowledge with the anti-realist alternative. 
In more detail, the plan of t his chapter is as follows. Sections 5.2-8 will defend a 
reliabilist account of knowledge. Such reliabilist theories are nowadays fairly widely 
accepted; but a distinctive feature of my defence will be its appeal to the point of the 
concept of knowledge , rather than to intuitions about test cases. In sections 5.9-13 I 
shall then show how this reliabilist account of knowledge provides an answer to the 
traditional sceptical problem of induction. Sections 5.14-17 will then generalize this 
answer and addr ess some other arguments for scepticism. 
5.2 Knowledge and the Project of Enquiry
Let me start with a question raised in Chapter 2 of Bernard Williams' Descartes 
(1978). Williams asks: why do human beings want knowledge? He takes i t as given, 
as I shall, that humans want true beliefs. But, as we all know, a belief can be true and 
yet not be knowledge, as when it is is a mere hunch or some other lucky chance. So 
the point of the question is: why do we want our beliefs to be known, in addition to 
being true? 
Williams' answer goes as follows. Human beings are prone to false beliefs. So, if our 
desire for true beliefs is not to be idle, we will need to exercise ourselves to achieve it. 
It is no good, however, to start chec king through all your beliefs with the intention of 
discarding the false ones. To have a belief is to take that belief to be true. So once you 
have formed your beliefs, internal inspection will not serve to distinguish the true 
from the false ones. Ins ofar as you are prone to error, the damage will already have 
been done. 
The only effective way for us to ensure that our beliefs are true is to block the error at 
source, by bringing it about that the processes by which we acquire beliefs in the first 
place are ones that generally yield true beliefs. So Williams argues that the desire for
true beliefs itself generates the desire that our beliefs should issue from processes that 
generally produce truths. And then, finding it independently plausibl e that beliefs 
produced by such processes should count as knowledge, Williams has an answer to
his original question as to why we should want knowledge: our desire for knowledge 
derives from our desire to avoid error, in that attaining knowledge is the only effective 
means by which humans can avoid error. 
I want to draw something more ambitious from this analysis. I think that, in addition 
to explaining why we should want knowledge, Williams' story also shows us what 
knowledge is. Williams takes it as given, from outside his analysis, that beliefs 
generated by truth-producing processes will count as knowledge. But I think that his 
story also explains why we have this concept of knowledge, why we pick out beliefs 
generated by a truth-producing p rocess as knowledge, as an especially good kind of 
belief. My idea here is that our concern to avoid error makes us especially interested 
in the state we need to get into as a means to avoiding error, and that this is why we 
call that state "knowledge" - the state, to repeat, of having acquired a true belief from 
a process which generally produces true beliefs.2
5.3 Certainty and Reliability
The above remarks prompt an immediate question: how truth-productive does a b 
elief-forming process need to be in order to be an effective means of avoiding error, 
and therefore to qualify as a source of knowledge? In particular, is it enough that it 
merely be reliable, in the sense that it generally delivers true beliefs as a mat ter of 
contingent fact in this world? Or does it need in addition to yield certainty, in the 
sense that it should be impossible for a belief issuing from that process to be false? 
Much traditional philosophical thinking assumes that knowledge requ ires certainty. 
But from the point of view of my remarks in the last section it is not clear why 
certainty should be necessary. Knowledge, I have suggested, is the state that we need 
to get into if we are to succeed in avoiding error. But we will succe ed in this aim as 
long as we have belief-forming processes which are reliable in this world. That such 
processes would lead us astray if things were different does not mean that they will 
lead us astray, as things are. This line of thought suggests that the traditional demand 
for certainty may be a mistake, perhaps fostered by an over-optimistic view of what 
human thought can achieve, but inessential to knowledge itself. 
I shall return to the idea that the demand for certainty may be a mistake in section 5.5 
below. But first, in the rest of this section and the next, let me say a bit more about the 
contrast I have drawn between reliability and certainty. Note that I have defined 
certainty objectively, rather than pyschologically: the issue is whether it is in fact 
impossible for a given belief-forming process to produce a false belief, not whether 
the subject is aware of this, nor whether it yields some feeling of absolute security. It 
is this objective notion that matters to the arguments of this chapter. However, there 
are obvious links between it and subjective requirements on knowledge. For, as 
Descartes so forcefully argued, the only plausible source of certainty in the objective 
sense derives from various operations of the conscious m ind -- in particular, from 
introspection and intuition. And so, if we can achieve knowledge with objective 
certainty, then we will also, as it happens, have "subjective warrants" available, in that 
we will always be able to tell introspectively that our knowledge has come from these 
putatively infallible conscious sources. 
ÊÊ From the reliabilist point of view, by contrast (henceforth I will use "reliabilism" 
to mean the view that only reliability is required for knowledge), any subjective 
requiremen ts on knowledge are gratuitous.Ê For, in order for a belief-forming 
process to be reliable, there is no need for its reliability, or even its existence, to be 
available to consciousness.Ê According to reliabilism, we will know, say, that there is 
a table in front of us, just in case the unconscious visual processes that give rise to 
such perceptual beliefs generally deliver true beliefs, whether or not we are aware of 
this.Ê There is therefore no pressure, given reliabilism, to reconstruct such perceptual 
knowledge as first involving some infallible introspection of some sensory idea, and 
then some intuitively compelling inference from this idea to the presence of a table.Ê 
If the demand for certainty in knowledge is unmotivated, then so too is this recon 




5.4Ê Knowledge and Normativity
It is sometimes felt that reliabilist epistemology changes the subject.ÊÊ As I have just 
pointed out, reliabilism implies that whether or not we kno w will often hinge on 
matters, such as the reliability of some visual process, which lie quite outside our 
consciousness.Ê But this seems to imply that we are at the mercy of nature, that we 
cannot do anything to affect whether or not we know.Ê And this t hen makes 
reliabilist epistemology seem a quite different subject from the traditional version 
(henceforth I shall use "traditional" to refer to views according to which knowledge 
requires certainty or subjective warrants3).Ê For surely a centr al concern of 
traditional epistemology was the normative question of what we should do in order to 
ensure that our beliefs are knowledge. 
ÊÊ However, this reaction to reliabilism involves a fallacy.Ê It is true that traditional 
conceptions of knowledg e offer advice on how to achieve knowledge:Ê roughly, you 
should consciously monitor your thought processes, and avoid any which are not 
necessarily infallible.Ê And it is true that reliabilism does not concur in this advice.Ê 
But this is not because reli abilism has stopped offering advice on how to know, but 
simply because reliabilism offers different advice. 
ÊÊ Where traditionalists advise aspirant knowers to monitor what goes on in their 
conscious minds, reliabilists will simply advise them to take whatever steps are 
needed to bring it about that their beliefs come from reliable processes.Ê Such steps 
may well call for us to influence processes which lie outside consciousness, but that is 
no reason to conclude we cannot succeed.Ê After all, most of the things we influence 
lie outside consciousness, like our environments, our physical health, and so on.Ê 
Similarly, there is no reason why we cannot influence non-conscious aspects of our 
belief-forming processes, by such means as rote learning, adjust ing the working of 
instruments we rely on, and so on4.Ê (Reliabilists will allow that conscious 
monitoring is one way to improve the reliability of our belief-forming processes.Ê But 
it is not the only way.) 
ÊÊ To guard against a possible m isunderstanding, let me emphasise that I am not 
suggesting that it is a requirement on knowledge that knowers must take active steps 
to bring it about that their beliefs are knowledge.Ê I am aware that I began this 
chapter by identifying the concept of kn owledge as the state someone concerned to 
avoid error (a "concerned enquirer" henceforth) wants to get into as a means to 
avoiding error.Ê But it does not follow from this that the only way to be a knower is 
to take active steps to get into that state.Ê F or you may already be in the requisite 
state, not because you did anything to make your belief-forming processes reliable, 
but simply because they were reliable to start with.Ê Such passive knowers will 
already be in the state concerned enquirers aim to g et into, even though they do not 
themselves share the concern to get into that state.5
Ê 
Ê 
5.5Ê Rationales versus Intuitions
I have just argued that reliabilism does not abandon the traditional normative issue of 
how best to a cquire knowledge.Ê In this section I want to consider a rather different 
argument for thinking that reliabilism changes the subject.Ê This appeals, not to 
considerations of normativity, but directly to intuitions about knowledge.Ê Many 
philosophers take i t to be intuitively obvious that subjective warrants are part of the 
concept of knowledge. And so they conclude that reliabilism, which dispenses with 
such requirements, must be wrong. 
ÊÊ My response to this is that intuitions are not the only way to evaluate a theory of 
knowledge.Ê There is a vast contemporary literature which aims to decide between 
reliabilism and traditional theories solely by appeal to intuitions about ingenious test 
cases.6Ê Unfortunately, however, these intuitions wei gh on both sides, and the 
literature based on them is notoriously indecisive.Ê By contrast, my approach in this 
paper has not appealed to intuitions, but has tried to identify an underlying concept of 
knowledge, by locating the role it plays in our thinki ng, by trying to understand why 
knowledge is such a matter of concern to human beings. 
ÊÊ My suggestion has been that knowledge is tied up with our desire to avoid false 
beliefs:Ê it is the state a concerned enquirer needs to get into as a means to ac hieving 
this desire.Ê Given this identification of the concept of knowledge, so to speak, we 
can then investigate more detailed conceptions, or theories, let us call them, of what 
that state is, more detailed theories of exactly what state an active enqui rer needs to 
get into as means to avoiding error.Ê The theory I am defending is that the requisite 
state is acquiring a belief from a reliable processes.Ê The theory that certainty and 
hence subjective warrants are required is a different theory, but stil l a theory, in the 
terminology I am using, of the same concept of knowledge. 
ÊÊ This is why I think that any intuitions which may favour the traditional theory 
over the reliabilist alternative are indecisive.Ê If I have shown that the reliabilist theo 
ry is the right theory, in that acquiring a belief from a reliable process is indeed what 
is needed as the means to avoid error, then I have therewith shown that the traditional 
theory and the intuitions that support it are mistaken. 
ÊÊ Perhaps there remains a gap here.Ê Suppose it is granted that I have identified the 
underlying concept of knowledge successfully, and have shown that reliabilism is the 
theory of knowledge that best fits it.Ê An obvious question which then arises is why 
anybody should have had contrary ideas about certainty and subjective warrants in the 
first place.Ê For, as I have told the story, reliabilism, as opposed to the traditional 
theory, follows pretty quickly from the concept of knowledge, thus making it 
mysterious why anyb ody should ever have thought anything more was needed.Ê We 
cannot simply rest with the suggestion, offered briefly in passing earlier, that 
traditional ideas about knowledge may have been fostered by excessive optimism 
about what can be achieved.Ê For the possibility of achieving something does not 
explain why we should want it, if it is not already desirable. 
ÊÊ I shall return to this issue in section 5.8.Ê But first let me comment briefly on the 
similarities between the strategy outlined in this sec tion and that defended by Edward 
Craig in "The Practical Explication of Knowledge" (1986).Ê At a detailed level, 
Craig's views differs from mine:Ê he offers a third-person account of the concept of 
knowledge, by contrast with my first-person account, argu ing that knowledge is the 
state our informants need to be in, for us to avoid error, not the state that we ourselves 
need to be in.Ê But at the level of general strategy, Craig and I are in accord, in that 
he too seeks to offer an account of the point of the concept of knowledge, and to use 
this account to explain the nature of the concept, rather than simply trying to identify 
the concept from intuitions alone. 
ÊÊ As to our differences, my objection to Craig's line would be that he is in effect 
focus ing on the special case in which we succeed in avoiding error by acquiring 
beliefs from informants who succeed in avoiding error.Ê I accept that this special case 
may well have been of primary significance in the historical development of the 
everyday con cept of knowledge, in that worrying about your informants' reliability 
calls for rather less sophistication than worrying about your own reliability (cf. Craig, 
op cit, p 215).Ê But, even so, Craig's third-person focus seems to me to have the 
disadvantage of cutting the link with the traditional normative issue of what we 
should do to avoid error.Ê That is, even if it is unfaithful to the history of the concept 
of knowledge to view the desire for good informants as a special case of a general
desire to ha ve good belief-forming processes, I would argue that the more general 
perspective I have adopted nevertheless has the advantage of showing how the 
concept of knowledge relates to familiar philosophical worries about knowledge. 
Ê 
Ê 
5.6Ê Knowle dge and Percentages
How much reliability should a reliabilist require for knowledge?Ê I shall consider two 
dimensions to this question.Ê First, I shall consider whether we need 100% reliability, 
or whether some lesser percentage, such as 95%, say, is enough.Ê Second, I shall ask 
over what range of possibilities the relevant percentage is to be assessed. 
ÊÊ On the percentage question, it would be a mistake to think that the rejection of 
certainty has already decided this question in favour of some thing less than 100%.Ê 
For "certainty", as I have been using it, implies that a belief-forming process cannot 
go wrong, will deliver 100% true beliefs in all possible worlds.Ê This is a much 
stronger requirement than 100% reliability in this world.Ê So we can reject certainty 
and still uphold a requirement of 100% contingent reliability.Ê On the other hand, 
even the latter seems a fairly strong requirement.Ê So perhaps we should consider 
arguments in favour of some lesser percentage. 
ÊÊ On the second question, about the range of possibilities, the argument so far has 
shown it would be a mistake to require this degree of reliability to hold up across all 
possible worlds.Ê But, as we shall see, there may remain reasons for wanting it to 
hold up across a t least some counterfactual situations. 
ÊÊ Let me deal with the percentage question first.Ê I shall return to the question about 
the range of possibilities in the next section.Ê Up to a point, it is possible to by-pass 
the percentage question.Ê Suppos e a given belief-forming process delivers beliefs 
which are true 95% of the time.Ê Then the appropriate output from that process would 
not be a full belief in the first place, but a 0.95 degree of belief.Ê After all, if you 
believe it is going to rain tom orrow on the basis of a 95% reliable method of 
forecasting, you would be ill-advised to bet a million pounds to a penny, or indeed to 
stake anything more than nineteen to win one, on its raining tomorrow.Ê So if 
knowledge unqualifiedly requires belief, as I have implicitly been assuming 
throughout, then this in itself seems to call for belief-forming processes which deliver 
truths with 100% reliability. 
ÊÊ Still, perhaps it is a bit quick to assume that knowledge requires strictly full 
belief.Ê After all, in everyday discourse we certainly refer to beliefs of high, but less 
than strictly full, degree as "beliefs" simpliciter, and to that extent we should expect 
the notion of knowledge also to encompass sufficiently well-founded beliefs of high, 
but no t full, degree.Ê But, having said this, there is then an obvious answer to the 
question of how well-founded such a belief of high, but not full, degree needs to be to 
qualify as knowledge.Ê For, under the present suggestion, everyday discourse has 
certain standards, perhaps varying from context to context, of how firmly a belief has 
to be held to qualify as a belief simpliciter.Ê So why not simply incorporate those 
standards into our analysis of knowledge, and say that for a belief to be knowledge it 
shou ld come from a process whose reliability is at least sufficient to warrant the 
degree of confidence required for the belief to qualify as a belief simpliciter in the 
first place, and not just as what even everyday discourse would consider as a partial 
bel ief? 
ÊÊ It will be helpful for what follows to observe that, while it is certainly true that we 
often allow beliefs of less than strictly full degree to qualify as knowledge, there is 
also a practical sense in which it is always better to get a belief from 100% reliable 
processes.Ê To put it simply, the reason is that such beliefs will then be true, and so 
decisions informed by them will succeed with probability one, whereas, if those 
beliefs came from less than 100% reliable processes, then the actio ns they informed 
would be less likely to succeed. 
ÊÊ Actually, this puts the point rather too simply, in that even if your beliefs are proof 
against error, they may still not be informative enough to tell you how to achieve 
some result;Ê and, even if your beliefs are informative enough, you may fail to draw 
the inference correctly.Ê But these two caveats would apply equally even if the same 
set of beliefs came from less than 100% reliable processes, and so do not affect the 
point that it is always pre ferable, from the point of view of achieving your desires, to 
get a full belief from a 100% process, rather than a less than strictly full belief from a 
less reliable process. 
ÊÊ It should also be admitted that in many cases the extra costs of getting 100% 
reliability will not be worth the extra probability of success, in which case we will do 
better to settle for a partial belief.Ê This is no doubt why everyday discourse does not 
make strictly full belief a precondition of knowledge in general.Ê But this merely 
calls for a yet further qualification, and still does not affect the underlying point that, 
when costs are equal, full belief from 100% reliable processes is always better.7
Ê 
Ê 
5.7Ê Nearby Possible Worlds
Let me n ow turn to the second question raised at the beginning of this section:Ê what 
range of possibilities is relevant to the reliability of belief-forming processes?Ê At 
first sight it might seem to follow from my overall argument that reliability in the 
actua l world is all that matters.Ê After all, as I observed earlier, reliability in this 
world is all that we need in order to avoid error.Ê However, there are good reasons 
why knowledge calls for more than merely this-worldly reliability. 
ÊÊ Let us return to the idea that knowledge is the state concerned enquirers need to 
get into in order to avoid error.Ê It is true that concerned enquirers have no interest in 
reliability in non-actual worlds as such.Ê Nevertheless, in acquiring processes which 
are relia ble in this world, concerned enquirers will inevitably acquire processes 
which are reliable in a range of non-actual situations as well. 
ÊÊ The reason is that, if you are an concerned enquirer, you will not be able to 
anticipate the future in enough d etail to be able to tell exactly when you are going to 
use any given belief-forming process, and so will not know exactly which truths that 
process needs to deliver in order to be reliable in the actual world.Ê Instead, you will 
inevitably have only limit ed knowledge about the general nature of the world and 
your particular situation in it8, information which will narrow down the range of 
circumstances you may in future find yourself in, but it certainly will not tell you 
exactly what they will be.Ê So, in aiming for reliable belief-forming processes, you 
will inevitably be constrained to aim for belief-forming processes which will reliably 
deliver true beliefs across the entire range of possible circumstances that your current 
information leav es it open you may end up in.Ê Since not all the possibilities in that 
range will become actual, you will inevitably be aiming to get into a state which 
would deliver true beliefs in various nearby possible worlds, as well as in the actual 
one. 
ÊÊ So my overall approach to knowledge accommodates the requirement that 
knowledge should have a certain degree of counterfactual reliability.Ê Note, however, 
that this is still a long way short of requiring reliability in all possible worlds, or even 
reliabili ty in all causally possible worlds.Ê For the information already possessed by 
concerned enquirers will still in general be enough to rule out the possibility of their 
being in most possible worlds (such as the world where you are manipulated by 
Descartes' evil demon) or even in most causally possible worlds (such as the world 
where you are a brain in a vat).9
Ê 
Ê 
5.8Ê The Attractions of Certainty
I promised to return to the question of why certainty should be intuitively plaus ible as 
a requirement for knowledge.Ê A serious answer to this question would include an 
historical dimension, examining the development of Western epistemological notions, 
with particular reference to the mediaeval distinction between demonstration and o 
pinion, to the seventeenth and eighteenth century struggles to find a place for the 
newly emerging scientific knowledge within this distinction, and, perhaps most 
important of all, to the religious dimensions which so animated the participants in 
these de bates.Ê However, any such historical investigation is beyond the scope of 
this book.Ê Instead let me offer a possible philosophical explanation of the pull of 
certainty, not as a competitor to an historical account, but as a possible complement. 
ÊÊ I have just argued that knowledge requires not only reliability in the actual world, 
but reliability across all worlds which are possible, relative to the information open to 
concerned enquirers.Ê However, in discussing this issue of counterfactual reliabil ity, 
I have so far implicitly been taking it for granted that our notional concerned 
enquirers are aiming for full beliefs from 100% reliable processes.Ê But, as we saw 
earlier, in many practical contexts it will often be more efficient to settle for less than 
full beliefs, delivered by belief-forming processes of appropriately high, but less than 
perfect, reliability. 
ÊÊ Now, an enquirer who was concerned to acquire such a less than full belief would 
be entitled to ignore, when assessing the reliabil ity of the relevant belief-forming 
process, not only all worlds which are impossible relative to his or her current 
information, but also any worlds which fall below an appropriate threshold of 
probability relative to that current information.Ê For clearl y the fact that the process 
would be unreliable in such unlikely circumstances does not give a concerned believer 
sufficient reason to withhold a high degree of belief from its deliverances. 
ÊÊ Add to this last point the consideration, elaborated in s ection 5.6, that, although it 
is often perfectly sensible to settle merely for a high degree of belief, it is always 
better, especially where it is important that your actions will not fail, to get full beliefs 
from 100% reliable processes.Ê Putting these two points together, it follows that your 
knowledge will get better the more possible circumstances with any non-zero 
probability your belief-forming processes are reliable across. 
ÊÊ This does not of course amount to a good argument for thinking tha t the best 
thing would be to acquire beliefs from processes that are reliable across all possible 
worlds.Ê Even if it is a good thing to be reliable across all worlds with non-zero 
probability relative to current knowledge, this is a long way short of rel iability across 
all possible worlds.Ê For, as I have said, most possible circumstances will be 
downright impossible relative to the information available to any concerned 
enquirer.Ê Nevertheless, one can see how it would be easy to slide, from the thought 
that you need ideally to guard against any possibilities that your information leaves 
with any non-zero probability, to the thought that you need ideally to guard against 
any possibilities whatsoever. 
Ê 
Ê 
5.9ÊÊ The Problem of Induction?Ê Wha t Problem?
I turn now to the problem of induction.Ê Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, 
that the general form of induction is simple enumeration.Ê (I do not really think this is 
a good model for inductive inferences.Ê But it will help the e xposition to assume so 
for a while.)Ê So, for example, from the premises, that N ravens have been black so 
far, we conclude that all ravens are black.Ê Schematically, 
Ê 
(1)ÊÊ Fa1 & Ga1 
ÊÊ . 
ÊÊ . 
ÊÊ FaN & GaN 
ÊÊ _______ 
Ê 
ÊÊ All Fs are Gs 
Ê 
ÊÊ The traditional complaint about this form of inference is that it is logically 
invalid.Ê The conclusion does not follow logically from the premises.Ê It is logically 
possible that the premises be true but the conclusion be false.Ê For reliabilists, 
however, this complaint has no force.Ê Since a form of inference can well be 
contingently reliable without being logically guaranteed, reliabilists can simply 
respond to the traditional complaint by arguing that the illogical ity of inductive 
inferences is no reason to deny that such inferences yield knowledge. 
ÊÊ Perhaps it is worth pausing briefly to explain how the notion of reliability applies 
to inferences.Ê Though I have not treated this explicitly so far, the approp riate notion 
is obviously conditional reliability:Ê the conclusion should always be true in the 
actual world, if the premises are.Ê (This will then ensure, for a reliabilist, that reliable 
inferences will transmit knowledge, that they will yield known con clusions when 
applied to known premises.Ê For if the premises are known, in the sense that they are 
true and reliably arrived at, then any conclusion derived from a conditionally reliable 
inference will also be true and reliably arrived at, and so known.) 
ÊÊ It is tempting to leave the problem of induction here, with the observation that the 
logical invalidity of induction does not mean its conclusions are not knowledge.Ê 
However, I suspect that most readers will be unpersuaded by this quick way with 
inductive scepticism, even if they are persuaded by the general arguments for 
reliabilism.Ê So in the next X sections I shall consider whether there are any further 
reasons why a reliabilist should worry about induction.Ê Accordingly, I shall now 
take it as given that reliabilism is the right account of knowledge in general;Ê the 
issue to be considered is whether any sceptical doubts about induction still arise 
within this assumption. 
Ê 
Ê 
5.10Ê Is Induction Reliable?
One possible worry a bout the simple reliabilist response to the problem of induction 
sketched in the last section is that it seems little different from the "analytic 
justification of induction" proposed by Edwards (1949) and Strawson (1952, Ch. 9).Ê 
Yet it is now widely agr eed that inductive inferences cannot be shown to be 
legitimate simply by observing, as the "analytic justification" does, that most people 
would characterize induction as a central case of "rational" thinking.Ê For such facts 
of common usage leave it open that there may be underlying requirements for a form 
of reasoning to be rational, which are not in fact satisfied by induction, are that most 
people may therefore be in error in holding induction to be rational. 
ÊÊ However, the reliabilist response t o induction is quite distinct from the analytic 
justification.Ê Reliabilists do not accept a form of reasoning as rational just because it 
is widely regarded as "rational", but only insofar as it satisfies the underlying 
requirement of reliably delivering truths.10 In particular, reliabilists will deem 
induction to be rational, and its conclusions therefore knowledge, not because it is 
called "rational", but because they believe that it is in fact a reliable method of getting 
new truths out of old ones. 
ÊÊ However, this now points to an obvious problem.Ê That induction reliably 
generates truths is itself a substantial contingent claim.Ê Yet no support has so far 
been offered for this.Ê We reliabilist friends of induction seem simply to be t aking it 
for granted that induction is a reliable method of inference, and then concluding, in 
virtue of our general reliabilism about knowledge, that induction yields knowledge.Ê 
But what basis do we have for the initial assumption that induction is reli able? 
ÊÊ Some reliabilists are inclined to respond, at this stage of the proceedings, that we 
do not need to know that we know in order to know.11Ê I think this is the wrong 
move.Ê It is perfectly true, of course, that ordinary non-philosop hical knowers do not 
need to know that they know.Ê But the present demand for a defence of the claim that 
induction yields knowledge is not being made of ordinary knowers who are using 
inductions, but rather of us philosophers who are talking about induct ions, and in 
particular about the question of whether inductions yield knowledge.Ê We reliabilist 
friends of induction are explicitly claiming that inductive inferences yield knowledge 
because they reliably yield truths.Ê Given this, it is perfectly reaso nable for someone 
to challenge us to provide support for this claim. 
ÊÊ Of course, if we fail to meet this challenge, this will not necessarily show that 
induction does not yield knowledge.Ê To lack any grounds for accepting the 
reliability of inducti on is not yet to have grounds for denying it.Ê But such a stand-
off would be a failure for us friends of induction, and a success for our sceptical 
challengers.Ê The point at issue is whether induction yields knowledge, that is, given 
reliabilism, whether induction reliably generates truths.Ê We friends of induction say 
yes, our sceptical challengers ask for support for this claim.Ê If we can't answer them, 
then they will have succeeded in showing we aren't entitled to our stance. 
Ê 
ÊÊ So to uphol d induction as a source of knowledge we need to show that inductive 
inferences are reliable.Ê However, now we are clear about this need, I do not think it 
is hard to satisfy.Ê The obvious way to find out whether induction is reliable is to 
examine such ev idence as bears on the matter.Ê When people make inductions, do 
their conclusions turn out to be true?Ê There are plenty of past examples of people 
making inductions.Ê And when they have made inductions, their conclusions have 
indeed turned out true.Ê So we have every reason to hold that in general inductive 
inferences yield truths.Ê That is: 
(2) When person1 induced, from N observations of A going with B, that All As areÊ 
Bs, this conclusion1 was true 
ÊWhen person2 induced, from N observations of C going.with D, that All Cs areÊ Ds, 
this conclusion2 was true 
Ê. 
Ê 
ÊWhen personN induced, from N observations of L going with M, that All LsÊ are 
Ms, this conclusionN was true 
Ê_____________ 
ÊWhenever someone induces, their conclusio n is true. 
Ê 
Ê 
5.11ÊÊ The Legitimacy of Normal Methods
Let me first put to one side two obvious worries about the premises of this argument.Ê 
First, aren't there plenty of past examples of unsuccessful inductions with fal se 
conclusions, as well as successful ones with true conclusions?Ê Second, how can we 
know that even the successful inductions are successful, given that observation of the 
past will only show, for example, that As have been Bs so far, not that all As are Bs?Ê 
I shall deal with both these points in due course (in section 5.17 and footnote 14 
respectively).Ê But for the moment it will helpful to ignore them, and attend instead 
to the move from the premises to the conclusion of (2).Ê For it will not have es caped 
the notice of most readers that this is itself an inductive inference, of just the kind 
whose reliability we are presently concerned to investigate. 
ÊÊ However, is there anything wrong with this?Ê It is not as if the discussion so far 
has identi fied some flaw in induction, of a kind which would imply that it ought to be 
eliminated from the battery of procedures by which we normally arrive at our 
beliefs.Ê In particular, we have agreed that the logical invalidity of inductive 
inferences in itself casts no discredit on induction.Ê Given this, when a certain 
question of fact is raised -- namely, are inductive inferences always reliable? -- what 
is more natural than to try resolve this question by means of our normal procedures of 
investigation, whi ch include, as it happens, our inductive procedures? 
Ê 
ÊÊ I know that to some philosophical sensibilities this will seem unduly complacent:Ê 
surely we aren't entitled to any methods of investigation, until we have demonstrated 
their worth.Ê But wh ere are we supposed to start?Ê We certainly need to begin with 
some methods of thought, lest we lapse into philosophical catatonia.Ê Many 
philosophers, I realize, will want to follow Descartes, and restrict our initial methods 
to introspection and intuiti on.Ê But Descartes' rationale for this restriction was that it 
promised certainty, and we have already argreed that this is an unneccessary 
desideratum on our methods of thought.Ê It would seem equally sensible to continue 
with our normal methods of thoug ht, at least until we uncover some reason to distrust
them.Ê And these methods will include induction, since, to repeat, we have not as yet 
been given any reason to distrust induction. 
Ê 
5.12Ê Varieties of Circularity
Still, even if nothing has as yet been shown wrong with induction in general, it may 
well be felt that there is something wrong with the inductive argument (2) in 
particular.Ê For isn't (2) a circular argument, and therefore illegitimate?Ê This 
objection needs t o be treated carefully.Ê It is true, as we shall shortly see, that 
circularity of a certain sort is present in (2).Ê However, provided we keep firmly in 
mind the specific argumentative task to which (2) is directed, we shall also see that 
this circularity is not damning. 
ÊÊ As a first step, we need to distinguish between "premise-circularity" and "rule-
circularity".12 An argument is premise-circular if its conclusion is contained among its 
premises.Ê An argument is rule-circular if it reach es the conclusion that a certain rule 
of inference is reliable by using that self-same rule of inference.Ê Clearly premise-
circularity is a vice in an argument.Ê The point of an argument is to take us from old 
beliefs, which we already accept as premises, to some new belief as a conclusion.Ê 
But if the conclusion is already contained in the premises, then the argument will fail 
in this primary task.Ê However, argument (2) is clearly not premise-circular.Ê It is a 
genuinely expansive argument, whose conclu sion, that all inductions yield true 
conclusions, manifestly outruns its premises, that N inductions so far have done so.13
ÊÊ On the other hand, argument (2) is rule-circular.Ê Even if the claim that induction 
is reliable does not appear a mong its premises, it does use an inductive inference to 
reach its conclusion that induction is reliable.Ê I have a number of comments to make 
about the rule-circularity of (2).Ê But first let me make a wider comment, not about 
argument (2) in particular, but about rule-circularity as such:Ê namely, that it can 
scarcely be a general requirement, on all legitimate forms of inference, that it be 
possible to show that they are reliable in some non-rule-circular way.Ê For this would 
disqualify even deduction as a legitimate form of inference.Ê (While it is possible to 
demonstrate that deductive inferences are reliable -- indeed necessarily reliable -- by 
means of the standard semantic soundness proofs, these demonstrations themselves 
unquestionably employ ded uction.)Ê So the fact that induction can only be shown 
reliable in a rule-circular way, as in (2), certainly does not in itself yield any 
immediate reason to distrust induction. 
ÊÊ But this is merely to repeat the point that we have as yet been givenn o good 
argument for distrusting induction. Our current concern, however, is whether (2) takes 
us beyond this, and gives us a positive basis for trusting induction, despite the fact 
that it is admittedly rule-circular.14Ê Let us recall the conte xt of argument in which (2) 
was put forward.Ê We agreed, on general reliabilist grounds, that induction does not 
need to be logically valid to yield knowledge, but will yield knowledge just in case it 
is reliable.Ê However, the sceptic then pointed out, w e cannot just take the belief that 
induction is reliable for granted.Ê To which we responded that we are not taking this 
for granted, but have a good argument, based on empirical evidence, for the 
conclusion that induction is reliable, namely, argument (2 ).Ê It seems to me that, in 
this specific context, the context of showing a sceptic who accepts reliabilism that we 
are not just helping ourselves to the belief that induction is reliable, (2) does just the 
job it is required to do. 
Ê 
5 .13ÊÊ Who Needs Persuading?
Perhaps the best way of showing this is by detailing some of the tasks argument (2) is 
not intended to fulfil.Ê For a start, we should recognize that argument (2) would be no 
good for persuading people who do not make inductions to start making them.Ê While 
the conclusion of (2), that inductions are reliable, would certainly be a good reason for 
such people to start inducing, if they accepted it, they clearly will not be persuaded to 
do so by (2), for the route from ( 2)'s premises to (2)'s conclusion requires just the 
kind of inductive inference that they eschew.Ê In particular, then, (2) will be no good 
for persuading people who have already reflected on the reliability of induction, and 
have been persuaded, for what ever reasons, that they ought to stop performing 
inductions, that they ought to start again. 
ÊÊ However, in the present context of argument, this is no demerit in (2).Ê Argument 
(2) is not addessed to people who avoid inductions.Ê We may yet discover good 
reasons for avoiding inductions, and indeed in the next few section I shall examine 
some possible such reasons, but right now we are assuming that nothing has yet been 
shown wrong with induction, and are considering whether, given this, argument (2) 
can show us whether induction is reliable.Ê So (2) should be thought of as addressed 
to people who have not yet been given any reason to distrust induction.Ê And (2) 
ought surely to persuade such people at least of its conclusion. 
ÊÊ I realise that ma ny readers will feel that, if (2) is a good argument in defence of 
induction, then it ought to be capable of persuading any intelligent being, with 
whatever epistemological habits.Ê But this is an extremely strong demand, and it is 
not at all clear why we should accept it.Ê The only plausible rationale, once more, 
seems to stem from the assumption that knowledge requires certainty, together with 
the assumption that the only kinds of belief-forming processes which can plausibly 
deliver certainty are consci ous operations whose logical infallibility is introspectively 
available.Ê Together these assumptions imply that any source of knowledge ought in 
principle to be recognizable as such by any conscious beings, in virtue of their 
introspective abilities;Ê and hence these assumptions imply that a good argument for 
the legitimacy of some source of knowledge ought to persuade all people whatsoever, 
however wrong-headed their starting position.Ê However, once we reject the 
assumption that knowledge requires certa inty, then this whole line of reasoning falls 
away, and the strong demand that a good defence of induction ought to persuade any 
conscious being is left without any obvious means of support. 
ÊÊ These last remarks bear on the question of "counter-induc tive" arguments for 
"counter-induction".Ê It is often observed that inductive arguments for induction, like 
(2), have counter-inductive mirror images.Ê Counter-inductivists, when they observe 
that a number of As are all Bs, conclude that the next A will n ot be a B.Ê When it is 
pointed out that this is illogical, they can respond, "So what?Ê Illogical it may be, but 
this doesn't show that it is not in fact a good way of reliably reaching true 
conclusions".Ê And when we say, "All right.Ê But what basis do y ou have for 
supposing that counter-induction does in fact deliver true conclusions?", they reply, 
"Ah, so that's what you're worried about.Ê Let us then look at the evidence that bears 
on the question.Ê On a large number of occasion in the past people hav e counter-
induced, and have been led to false conclusions.Ê So we conclude -- counter-
inductively -- that the next time we counter-induce we will get a true conclusion". 
There is room to dispute whether this is in fact a perfect mirror image of (2) (Cf Van 
Cleve, op cit, footnote 16.) But let that pass. The more important point is that, even if 
counter-inductivists can mirror (2), this does nothing to discredit (2) itself.Ê I have 
already conceded that (2) is not going to persuade people who do not make inductions 
to start making them. Counter-inductivism now simply gives us a further example of 
people who have abnormal inferential dispositions, and who will not therefore be 
persuaded by (2).Ê Except that the parable of the counter-inductivist s adds an extra 
twist, namely, that counter-inductivists will be persuaded, by their mirror of (2), to the 
conclusion that their abnormal counter-inductive dispositions are reliable.Ê But all 
this leaves (2) untouched.Ê We should not expect it to perform the impossible task of 
knocking imaginary non-inductivists out of their non-inductivism -- its task is only to 
allow normal people, like ourselves, to resolve the issue of whether induction is 
reliable. 
ÊÊ By this stage, some readers may be feeling th at argument (2) does not do very 
much.Ê Indeed, if it only works for people who already make inductions, is it really 
doing anything at all?Ê My answer is that it is not supposed to do very much.Ê Nearly 
all the serious work was finished before (2) came o n the scene.Ê Most importantly, 
the general arguments for reliabilism have already shown that the logical invalidity of 
induction is not a problem.Ê Argument (2) is just supposed to show that, given that 
there is nothing problematic about induction, then there is no barrier to our concluding 
that it is reliable, and hence that it yields knowledge. 
ÊÊ Trained philosophers naturally expect a "justification of induction" to do 
something to rehabilitate induction, in response to an argument that there is something 
wrong with it.Ê But (2) is not meant as a "justification" in this sense.Ê So we should 
not condemn it for its failure to be one. 
Ê 
5.14Ê The Strategy Generalized
As a first step towards generalizing the anti-sceptic al strategy outlined in the last few 
sections, let us be more realistic about induction.Ê I have already noted one way in 
which the above discussion of induction has involved an idealization, namely, in 
respect of the assumption that in our experience all past enumerative inductions have 
been successful.Ê This assumption is of course manifestly false.Ê There are plenty of 
good examples of enumerative inductions leading to false conclusions, from Russell's 
chicken who expected to be fed every day, to the N ewtonian physicists who expected 
acceleration always to be inversely proportional to rest mass. 
ÊÊ In any case, apart from such direct evidence, there is also a principled argument to 
show that simple enumerative induction cannot possibly be a reliabl e method of 
inference.Ê I refer to Goodman's "new problem of induction".Ê Goodman (1954) 
shows that there are far too many ways of classifying events, far too many As and Bs, 
for every instance of schema (1) to yield a true conclusion.Ê Indeed, Goodman sh ows 
how to construct, for every instance of (1) that might yield a true conclusion, an 
infinity of other instances which will then yield false conclusions. 
ÊÊ These are good arguments against enumerative induction.Ê It is important to 
recognize, howev er, that they are quite independent of the traditional objection to 
induction.Ê They do not just make the point that enumerative induction is logically 
invalid.Ê On the contrary, they show that enumerative induction is not just invalid, 
but downright unre liable. 
ÊÊ The moral, for us reliabilists who want to resist scepticism about induction, is that 
we had better not take our stand on simple enumerative induction as schematized in 
(1).Ê Rather, we need somehow to show that our actual inductive practic e has a more 
sophisticated structure, perhaps involving restrictions on the As and Bs which are 
candidates for projection, and perhaps limited in the degrees of belief which we 
extend to its conclusions. 
Ê 
ÊÊ I shall say a bit more about such an a lternative model of inductive inference 
shortly.Ê But first let me observe that such a model will open the way to the anti-
sceptical strategy outlined above once more.Ê Imagine that we can show that our 
actual inductive practice is more sophisticated than simple enumerative induction, and 
that it therefore cannot be discredited as unreliable by either Goodman's new problem 
or past performance. And imagine, furthermore, that when we investigate the 
reliability of our inductive methods, using existing metho ds of investigation, 
including those inductive methods themselves, we find ourselves able to conclude that 
it is reliable.Ê Then this defeats scepticism about our inductive practice.Ê As before, 
neither the fact that this practice may be invalid, nor the fact that its reliability might 
only be discoverable in a rule-circular way, will be a barrier to our concluding that it 
yields knowledge. 
Ê In this chapter I have been concentrating on induction.Ê But the anti-sceptical 
strategy I have used can be ge neralized to apply to our belief-forming methods in 
general, including such non-inferential methods as perception and memory. If the 
only objection to them is that they are not certain, in the sense that it is possible that 
they should yield false beliefs , then this is no reason to believe that they are not 
reliable.Ê And if, moreover, investigation shows that those methods are reliable, then, 




I now want to outline a more realistic model of induction, with the intention of 
showing that induction is not in fact discredited as unreliable by either Goodman's 
argument or by past perf ormance. 
Ê 
ÊÊ To start with Goodman, note that any solution to Goodman's problem is likely to 
lead us to view induction in terms of elimination rather than enumeration. For any 
solution will involve some limitation on the As which are possible can didates for 
being associated with any given B.Ê But if we have such a limited range of possible 
As, then it should be possible for us to find experimental data which will identify the 
actual antecedent of B by eliminating the other candidates, rather than by providing 
repeated instances of the relevant generalization. 
ÊÊ Within the context of deterministic assumptions, J.S.Mill's methods of induction 
show what kinds of data are required to reach such eliminative conclusions, given 
various kinds of ass umptions about limited ranges of possible antecedents.Ê Much 
contemporary science, it is true, does not assume determinism.Ê But there are 
probabilistic analogues of Mill's methods, which use techniques of analysis of 
variance and multiple regression to d iscriminate, among the factors which might in 
principle be correlated with some effect B, those which are genuinely rather than 
spuriously correlated with it.16
ÊÊ Mill's and related methods are nowadays little discussed by philosophers.Ê T his 
is unfortunate, for Mill's methods are clearly far more in accord with actual scientific 
practice than the standard philosophical model of induction by enumeration of 
instances.Ê Science does not need a a large number of repeated observations to estab 
lish that copper melts at 1084°C, or that chickenpox is caused by a herpes virus, or 
that water is H20.Ê Rather, since there are only so many possible melting points, or 
infectious agents, or combinations of elements, a few relatively simple observati ons 
will suffice in each such case to discriminate the actual law from the initially possible 
alternatives. 
ÊÊ No doubt part of the reason philosophers have been uninterested in Mill's methods 
is that Mill himself does not offer any satisfactory respo nse to sceptical doubts about 
induction.Ê But the argument of this chapter shows how we can defend Mill's 
methods against such sceptical doubts:Ê namely, by showing that those methods are a 
reliable source of true beliefs, and so of knowledge.Ê Moreover, the argument of this 
chapter shows that there is no reason why such a demonstration should not be rule-
circular:Ê what we want is some route to the conclusion that those methods are 
reliable, but not necessarily a route that avoids those methods themselve s. 
ÊÊ In the rest of this section I will sketch out one possible route to the conclusion that 
Millian methods of eliminative induction are reliable.17Ê But before I do so, let me 
observe that a demonstration of the reliability of Mill's met hods will also constitute 
an implicit answer to Goodman's new problem of induction.Ê For, in order for Mill's 
methods to be reliable, only a certain limited range of As can possibly associated be 
with any given B.Ê So any demonstration of the reliability of Mill's methods will need 
to show that these As are indeed the only candidates for projecting along with B.Ê 
That is, if Mill's methods work, then there must be general reasons why only some 
sorts of generalizations -- like "all emeralds are green" -- a re on the cards, and that 
others -- "all emeralds are grue" -- are not.Ê A demonstration of the reliability of 
Mill's methods will thus show why green is projectible with respect to emeralds and 
grue is not. 
ÊÊ Let us look a bit more closely at Mill's methods.Ê It is important, in thinking 
about the reliability of these methods, not to view the kind of background assumption 
which tells us, say, that B has a deterministic antecedent, and that A1, . . ., An are the 
only possibilities, as a premise to a Millian inductive inference, to which we conjoin 
the further, observationalÊ premises that A1, . . ., An-1 have been found without B, to 
conclude that An is the actual antecedent.18Ê For this would just make Millian 
induction a special case of deduction, and moreover it would leave the scientists who 
engaged in Millian inferences with an undischarged premise, namely, the premise that 
one of the A1, . . ., An is the deterministic antecedent of B. 
ÊÊ Rather, we should think of the observation of A1, . . ., An-1 without B as the sole 
premise to a Millian inductive inference.Ê We don't need to suppose that the scientists 
themselves know why this inference works (though they probably will);Ê all that 
matters, in the first instance, is that they are disposed, on observing A1, . . ., An-1 
without B, to conclude that An is the actual antecedent. 
ÊÊ The further thesis that B has a deterministic antecedent, and that A1, . . ., An are 
the only possibilities, need only come in at the philosophicalm eta-level, when we 
address the question of the reliability of the Millian inductive inference.Ê It is we 
philosophers, who want to ascertain whether the Millian inference is reliable, who 
need to know that one of the A1, . . ., An must be the deterministi c antecedent of B, 
not the scientists who actually make this inference. 
ÊÊ So the scientists who make Millian inferences are not necessarily guilty of helping 
themselves to undischarged premises.Ê The only premise they need is that A1, . . ., 
An-1 hav e been found without B, and that they can get from observation.Ê On the 
other hand, the complaint of undischarged premises can reasonably be levelled at a 
philosopher, like myself, who explicitly argues that such Millian inductive inferences 
are reliable, on the grounds that one of the A1, . . ., An must be the deterministic 
antecedent of B.Ê For I at least then owe some account of my basis for this latter 
claim. 
ÊÊ When we were still thinking of induction as simple enumeration, this was the 
point whe re we turned induction on itself, and used an inductive inference to arrive at 
the conclusion that induction is reliable.Ê If we could do this in the present context, 
then we would once more have an answer to sceptical questions about induction.Ê 
However, it is not so obvious that we can make the same move within the context of 
an eliminative approach to induction. 
ÊÊ Consider the inference by which medical scientists establish that chickenpox is 
due to a herpes virus.Ê We can construe the scientists as inferring this from a set of 
Mill-style observations about the presence and absence of various viruses in people 
with and without chickenpox.Ê And we can explain the reliability of this inference on 
the grounds that viral agents are the only possible c auses of infectious diseases that 
do not respond to antibiotics. 
ÊÊ But now what about this latter claim, that viruses are the only possible causes of 
antibiotic-resistant infectious diseases?Ê We need this claim to explain the reliability 
of the medi cal scientist's Millian inference.Ê But where does it come from?Ê The 
trouble is that we can't get it from the Millian inference in question itself, since this 
form of inference can only tell us which viruses are the causes of which antibiotic-
resistant i nfections, not which agents are responsible for antibiotic-resistant 
infections in general.Ê That is, the Millian inference in question isn't self-supporting 
in the way enumerative induction is. 
ÊÊ Perhaps we can still establish the general claim that viruses always cause 
antibiotic-resistant infectious diseases by another type of eliminative induction, 
different from the first.Ê What we would need would be a type which uses suitable 
observations to eliminate all the other possible agents apart from v iruses as the cause 
of such diseases, not one which eliminates all other viruses apart from the herpes 
virus as the cause of chickenpox. 
ÊÊ Now, it is plausible enough that there is such a reliable mode of eliminative 
induction.Ê But then the same pro blem arises again.Ê For the reliability of this new 
mode of eliminative induction will now rest on some further fact, such as that only a 
certain range of invasive physical agents that disrupt the biochemistry of the sufferers 
are possible candidate cause s of diseases.Ê And so the philosopher who wants to 
assert the reliability of this new form of eliminative induction has a new undischarged 
premise to cope with. 
ÊÊ A kind of regress threatens.Ê Eliminative inductions seem to fall naturally into a 
hie rarchy, with the reliability of each being explicable only with the help of 
assumptions which derive from a form of inference higher in the hierarchy.Ê We can 
explain the reliability of the procedures which show that a herpes virus causes 
chickenpox by in voking the assumption that antibiotic-resistant infectious diseases 
are always due to viruses.Ê But this assumption in turn needs to be established by a 
different procedure, whose reliability depends on some such assumption as that all 
diseases are due to invasive physical agents that disrupt the biochemistry of the 
sufferers.Ê And perhaps this assumption too can in turn be established by an 
eliminative induction, which uses relevant observations to discriminate between this 
assumption and other physicall y possible models of disease. But this then leaves us 
philosophers with the task of explaining how we came by the assumption that the 
physical possibilities are the only possibilities. 
ÊÊ We can expect to find this kind of heirarchy repeated in differ ent areas of 
science.Ê Perhaps the fact that such sequences will characteristically go from subject-
specific assumptions to general assumptions about physical possibility offers a way 
out of our problem.Ê If the regress is to stop, at some point we will n eed to find a 
form of eliminative induction which can establish its own reliability, as enumerative 
induction did earlier.Ê I would like tentatively to suggest that such a form of 
eliminative induction might be found at the level of basic physical science .Ê At this 
level the task is to discover the limits of physical possibility itself.Ê Basic physics 
aims to decide between between different theories of force, matter and spacetime, 
between different theories of what is physically possible.Ê Now, it is pla usible that at 
this level the inductive strategy used by physicists is to ignore any such theories 
which lack a certain kind of physical simplicity.Ê If this is right, then this inductive 
strategy, when applied to the question of the general constitution of the universe, will 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that the universe is composed of consituents which 
display the relevant kind of physical simplicity.Ê And then, once we have reached this 
conclusion, we can use it to explain why this inductive strategy is reliable.Ê For if the 
constituents of the world are indeed characterized by the relevant kind of physical 
simplicity, then a methodology which uses observations to decide between 
alternatives with this kind of simplicity will for that reason be a reliable route to the 
truth. 
ÊÊ It should be emphasized that this story does not depend on any a priori notion of 
simplicity.Ê To this extent the term "simplicity" is perhaps a misnomer.Ê The account 
simply depends on the existence of certain general features which characterize the 
true answers to questions of fundamental physical theory.Ê Far from being knowable 
a priori, these features may well be counterintuitive to the scientifically untrained.Ê 
Thus circular motion is not especially "simple", i the relevant sense, compared to the 
kinds of motion that results from inverse square force laws.Ê Discontinuity is not 
"simple", notwithstanding the fact that everyday experience shows us sharp 
boundaries between physical objects and their surroundings.Ê Explanations in terms 
of observable causes is not "simple", compared with explanation by microscopic 
hidden mechanisms. 
Ê 
5.16Ê The Historical Contingency of Knowledge
It follows from this last observation that the methods of inference which enable us to 
find out about the physical world are not native to human thinking.Ê At some point in 
human history people acquired the ability, which they did not have before, to focus 
specifically on certain kinds of explanations of physical phenomena, and to ignore 
others. 
ÊÊ This might seem to raise a problem for my overall response to scepticism.Ê My 
suggestion has been that we should check our existing methods of thought to confirm 
that they are reliable sources of true belief and hence of knowledge.Ê And, in answer 
to the objection that these checks themselves employ those same existing methods of 
thought, I have observed that we have as yet been given no reason to distrust those 
methods. 
ÊÊ However, some readers may feel that this strategy is markedly less plausible when 
applied to methods of thought which are historically happenstantial, rather than to 
those which are an innate part of the human cognitive endowment.Ê Demonstrations 
of reliability that depend on such innate methods of thought at least have the virtue of 
persuading all actual human beings;Ê it is only purely though-experimental 
individuals, like the counter-inductivists, who will be unpersuaded by such 
demonstrations of the existence of human knowledge.Ê But demonstrations of 
reliability by appeal to historically contingent methods of thought like the preference 
for "physically simple" hypotheses will fail to persuade many actual human beings as 
well -- namely, all those individuals in the historical, geographical, or cultural 
distance who have not adopted the contingent methods of thought in question. 
ÊÊ Still, does this matter?Ê That other people foreswear some method of thought is 
not in itself a conclusive reason for distrusting that method of thought, nor, therefore, 
for distrusting vindications of human knowledge that depend on it.Ê Maybe our 
reasons for thinking that we have knowledge, and that the sceptic is therefore wrong, 
will fail to persuade various actual human beings, as well as the imaginary counter-
inductivist.Ê But this scarcely shows they are not good reasons.Ê After all, there is 
plenty of evidence to show that many methods of thought which are native to human 
thinking are untrustworthy, and that we therefore do better to replace these native 
habits by historically contingent alternatives. 
ÊÊ Perhaps a kind of generalization from variability lies behind the widespread 
feeling that historically contingent methods of thought are epistemologically 
suspect.Ê I have in mind the following line of argument:Ê different people in different 
times and places have adopted many different procedures for deciding questions about, 
say, the causes of observable phenomena;Ê since these different procedures 
standardly deliver mutually inconsistent answers, only one of which can be true, most 
of these procedures must be unreliable;Ê so it is highly probable that any given such 
procedure must be unreliable;Ê in particular, therefore, it is highly probable that our 
currently preferred procedure is unreliable. 
ÊÊ However, once it is spelt out, the weakness in this line of argument is apparent.Ê 
For it presupposes that such a set of historically varying procedures forms a 
homogeneous caregory, whose overall inadequacies therefore detract equally from all 
members of the category.Ê However, there may well be relevant differences between 
members of the category, differences which block the inference from "most of the 
procedures in the group are unreliable" to "this particular procedure is probably 
unreliable".Ê For instance, it may be that some currently preferred procedure has been 
adopted as a result of critical reflection, rather than mere deference to tradition;Ê 
perhaps it makes use of controlled experiment, rather than mere hearsay;Ê maybe it 
involves mathematical precision, rather than mere guesswork.Ê These features do not 
of course provide a conclusive demonstration that the procedure in question is a 
reliable source of truth.Ê But they are surely sufficient to invalidate the argument that, 
since various procedures which lack these features are unreliable, our preferred 
procedure must be unreliable too.19
Ê 
5.17Ê The Pessimistic Meta-Induction
The argument from relativism considered in the last section needs to be distinguished 
from the well-known "pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity".Ê The 
"pessimistic meta-induction" also calls in question the reliability of the inductive 
strategies of modern science.Ê But instead of maintaining that there is nothing to 
choose between these strategies and the incompatible alternatives which have been 
practised by historically and culturally distant humans, the pessimistic meta-induction 
focuses directly on the output of modern scientific method, and argues straight off that 
this scientific method must be unreliable, since it characteristically issues in false 
beliefs. 
ÊÊ After all, the pessimists can point out, we now take it that Newtonian physics, the 
phlogiston theory of combustion, the theory that atoms are indivisible, and so on, are 
all false.Ê So doesn't it immediately follow that method by which these theories were 
reached cannot be a reliable route to the truth?20
ÊÊ This pessimistic meta-induction is unquestionably an important argument, which 
indicates that caution is necessary in scientific theorizing.Ê However, it raises many 
questions of detail, and it would extend our discussion unduly to treat it fully here.Ê I 
shall restrict myself to a few brief comments, which I hope will suffice to show that, 
even if the pessimistic meta-induction advises caution, it does not mean that we 
should withhold belief entirely from all scientific claims. 
ÊÊ The basic flaw in the pessimistic meta-induction mirrors that in the argument from 
variability discussed in the last section:Ê it lumps into one homogenous category 
items that deserve separate treatment.Ê The argument from variability lumps together 
all human thought processes.Ê Similarly the pessimistic meta-induction lumps 
together all scientific theories. 
Ê In so doing, the pessimistic meta-induction ignores important differences between 
scientific theories, differences which matter to the question of whether the historical 
record casts doubt on their truth..Ê For a start, the tendency to theoretical falsity is 
much more common in some areas of science than others.Ê Thus it is relatively 
normal for theories to be overturned in cosmology, say, or fundamental particle 
physics, or the study of primate evolution.Ê By contrast, theories of the molecular 
composition of different chemical compounds (such as that water is made of hydrogen 
and oxygen), or the causes of infectious diseases (chickenpox is due to a herpes virus), 
or the nature of everyday physical phenomena (heat is molecular motion), are 
characteristically retained once they are accepted.Ê So the testimony of past form 
counts against some kind of theories more than others.Ê Past scientific failures 
indicate caution about the thesis that quarks and leptons are the ultimate building 
blocks of matter.Ê But they give us no reason to doubt that water is made of hydrogen 
and oxygen. 
ÊÊ Nor need we regard this differential success-rate of different kinds of theories as 
an inexplicable historical datum.Ê It may simply be a result of the necessary evidence 
being more easily available in some areas than others.Ê Paleoanthropologists want to 
know how many hominid species were present on earth three million years ago.Ê But 
their evidence consists of a few pieces of teeth and bone.Ê So it is scarcely surprising 
that discoveries of new fossil sites will often lead them to change their views.Ê The 
same point applies on a larger scale in cosmology and particle physics.Ê Scientists in 
these areas want to answer very general questions about the very small and the very 
distant.Ê But their evidence derives from the limited range of technological 
instruments they have devised to probe these realms.Ê So, once more, it is scarcely 
surprising that their theories should remain at the level of tentative hypotheses.Ê By 
contrast, in those areas where adequate evidence is available, such as chemistry and 
medicine, there is no corresponding barrier to science moving beyond tentative 
hypotheses to firm conclusions. 
ÊÊ I do not necessarily want to suggest that there is a level of evidence which will 
ensure sure-fire inductive inferences, inferences that are 100% reliable in the actual 
world.Ê Maybe even the best achievable evidence will on occasion lead scientists 
astray.Ê However, by distinguishing between well supported and badly supported 
theories, we can at least avoid tarring all scientific conclusions with the failures of 
poorly supported speculations. 
ÊÊ If even the best evidence is less than sure-fire, then we ought never to accord 
strictly full belief to scientific conclusions.Ê Rather, we ought to tailor our degree of 
belief to the reliability of similarly evidenced conclusions, in the way indicated in 
section 5.6 above.Ê But as long as the success-rate of well evidenced inferences is 
high, this degree of belief can still be close to one.Ê Speculations based on meagre 
evidence may often turn out to be false.Ê But this is no reason to think all inductive 
conclusions will suffer the same fate. 
1. This terminology derives from Dummett, who introduced the term "anti-realist" for 
theories of meaning according to which truth is not evidence-transcendent.Ê (Cf 
Dummett, 1978, p 146 and passim.) 
2. Gettier cases show that we need an extra requirement.Ê Not only must you acquire 
a true belief from a process that generally produces true beliefs, but the truth of your 
belief must not be an accident relative to its coming from that process.Ê This extra 
requirement is a natural upshot of the hypothesis that knowledge is a state which is a 
means of avoiding error;Ê for if the truth of your belief is a result of a Gettier-style 
accident, then your avoidance of error won't be a result of your embodying a truth-
conducive process, in the sense that it won't be because the process generally 
produces truths that you have avoided error.Ê Rather, it will be because of some lucky 
fluke.Ê Cf. Williams, op cit, pp 43-4.Ê Further analysis is needed, of course, to make 
the relevant notion of accident precise. 
3. What of the many philosophical views, especially contemporary views, which 
favour subjective warrants, but not certainty?Ê I have two excuses for running the two 
requirements together.Ê First, I can think of no good rationale, as opposed to 
intuitions, in favour of the demand for subjective warrants, except as a corollary of the 
desire for certainty.Ê Second, most of my arguments will apply as much to former 
demand taken separately as to the latter. 
4. For more on the extent to which we can alter our non-conscious belief-forming 
processes, see my Reality and Representation (1987, ch 7.4, 7.6). 
5. Perhaps passive knowers should have at least this much in common with 
concerned enquirers:Ê their belief-forming processes should not just happen to be 
reliable, but should be present because they are reliable.Ê This suggestion will rule 
out purely fortuitous reliability, but will allow in reliability due to evolution, learning, 
and education, alongside the case where concerned enquirers adopt processes because 
they consciously recognize the reliability of those processes.Ê This suggestion also 
indicates a possible answer to the delicate question of how to individuate belief-
forming processes for purposes of assessing their reliablility:Ê namely, as a first 
approximation, we should individuate them by the same characteristics as are needed 
to explain their adoption.Ê Cf Papineau (1987, pp 136-8). 
6. See Shope The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research (1983). 
7. I am here assuming beliefs about non-chance matters.Ê Where genuine non-unitary 
chances are involved, the best degree of belief about any outcome will, of course, be 
different from one.Ê But even here it will always be better to get true beliefs of full 
degree about chances, belief-forming costs apart, for such beliefs will then ensure that 
in general your decisions maximize your objective chances of success. 
8. Some readers may be unhappy with these assumptions about the knowledge 
available to concerned enquirers.Ê There are two possible worries here, one about a 
possible circularity on my part, the other about a possible circularity on the part of 
concerned enquirers.Ê If you are worried about a circularity on my part, let me 
observe that my present concern is not to define knowledge, so much as to identify the 
role the concept plays in our thinking:Ê I think it is helpful in this task to consider the 
predicament of a concerned enquirer who already has some knowledge; it would be a 
further task, which I shall not attempt here, and which would indeed preclude mention 
of the knowledge of concerned enquirers, to specify necessary and sufficient 
conditions, in non-epistemological terms, for someone to be a knower.Ê If, on the 
other hand, you are worried about some kind of circularity on the concerned enquirer's 
part, on the grounds, perhaps, that any seriously concerned enquirer ought to start by 
assuming nothing, then your worry should be assuaged by the points made in sections 
5.11-13 below. 
9. Craig, op cit, pp. 218-21, argues similarly from the limited informational situation 
of an enquirer to a counterfactual requirement on knowledge.Ê But he is concerned 
with the kind of counterfactual reliability we want of our informants, given our 
limited information about the particular situation at hand, whereas I am interested in 
the counterfactual reliability we want of ourselves, given our limited general 
information about the situations we are going to be in.Ê The precise degree of 
counterfactual reliability required for knowledge is a complex issue, which I shall not 
pursue any further here, except to observe that this is an area where one good 
theoretical rationale seems to me to be worth a thousand delicate intuitons. 
10. This claim perhaps deserves further discussion.Ê Some reliabilists would hold that, 
while reliability suffices for knowledge, some kind of extra subjective warrant is 
needed for rationality.Ê In my view, however, the arguments about knowledge go 
through for rationality.Ê For a defence of the analogous point about "justification", 
see Goldman (1979). 
11. Cf Van Cleve (1984) p. 559, 562.Ê Much of my following defence of induction is 
influenced by Van Cleve's important article.Ê However, in the passages referred to, 
Van Cleve seems to deny that reliabilists need to defend the reliability of induction, 
on the grounds that reliability is an "external" requirement.Ê This seems to me an 
unfortunate slip, given that evaluations of reliabilist defences of induction are highly 
sensitive to prior judgements of exactly what the reliabilist needs to do. 
12. CfÊ Braithwaite (1953, pp 276-7), Van Cleve, op cit, p 558. 
13. There is a problem about the notion of premise circularity:Ê if "contained among 
the premises" just means logical implication, then all deductive arguments will be 
premise circular.Ê Some philosophers, most notably Descartes and Mill, take this to 
show that deduction is uninformative.Ê The majority prefer to understand 
"containment" more strictly.Ê This debate is irrelevant to our current concerns, 
however, since everybody will agree that the non-deductive argument (2) is not 
premise circular. 
14. If it does, then this will answer the second of the questions raised about the 
premises of (2) at the beginning of this section, namely, the question as to how we 
know that the conclusions ("All As are Bs") of past inductions are true. The answer is, 
by induction. For, if the distinction between rule- and premise-circularity legitimates 
the inductive move from (2)'s premises to (2)'s conclusion, then it will also serve to 
legitimate antecedent inductive moves from instances of As being Bs to "All as are 
Bs". Cf Van Cleve, op cit, pp 560-1. 
15. One of the aims of my Reality and Representation (1987) was to show how we 
might investigate all of our standard methods of belief-formation, as we might 
investigate any other natural phenomena, and discover that those methods are by and 
large reliable sources of truth. 
16. These probabilistic analogues of Mill's methods involve two inferential steps:Ê 
first from sample data to objective correlations, then from these correlations to causes. 
While this second step can be 100% reliable, the first cannot avoid the uncertainties of 
statistical inference. (Cf Papineau, 1993.) I have hopes for a reliabilist-style account 
of statistical inference, but there is no question of going into this here. 
17. This will expand the discussion in Papineau (1987, pp 196-8). 
18. This simple method of difference is just one of Mill's methods. For a full 
catalogue see the Appendix to Mackie (1974). 
19. In Reality and Representation my response to the argument from variability was 
that there is no variability among self-certifying batteries of belief-forming procedures, 
that is, batteries of procedures which generate conclusions about their own reliability 
(1987, ch 10). I still think this argument can be made to work, but it now seems rather 
a big hammer to crack a small nut. From my present perspective, self-certification is 
merely one example of the kind of relevant difference which can block the 
generalization from variability. 
20. Doesn't this argument undermine itself, by casting doubt on the present-day 
scientific theories whose truth it assumes when judging past theories to be false? But 
the argument can be cast as a reductio: if current theories are true, then past theories 
are false; so, by the pessimistic meta-induction, current theories are false; so current 
theories are false. (Cf Jardine, 198x, p x.) 
